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NEPAL’S ELECTION: A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION? 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Nepal’s constituent assembly (CA) elections marked a 
major step forward in the peace process, paving the 
way for the declaration of a federal democratic repub-
lic and the start of the constitution-writing process. 
Although falling short of an outright majority, the 
Maoists won a decisive victory at the 10 April 2008 
polls, securing a mandate for peace and change. How-
ever, the largely peaceful and well-managed vote 
opened a messy new round of political haggling and 
obstruction. The Maoists have been unable to secure 
agreement on a new coalition government. Other par-
ties, still struggling to accept their defeat, have set new 
conditions for supporting a Maoist-led administration. 
The elections delivered a clear and, to many, surpris-
ing result. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist, 
CPN(M)), emerged as the largest party by a wide 
margin, winning more than one-third of CA seats. 
The largest established parties, the Nepali Congress 
(NC) and Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marx-
ist-Leninist, UML), were not wiped out but have had 
difficulty coping with their relatively weak showing – 
their combined seats are less than those of the Mao-
ists. The NC was particularly hard hit by the strong 
performance of new Madhesi parties, among which 
the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) has secured a 
dominant position. Royalist parties failed to win a 
single first-past-the-post (FPTP) seat, only saving a 
toehold in the new assembly through the parallel pro-
portional representation (PR) contest. 
Party campaigning built the atmosphere for a lively 
and passionate contest. Long-suffering and politically 
sophisticated voters proved a testing audience, keen to 
hear what candidates had to say for themselves but 
well prepared to exercise their own judgement. It was 
not the cleanest of campaigns. The established parties 
resorted to old tricks to steal a march on their oppo-
nents. The Maoists, and to a lesser extent the MJF, 
distinguished themselves primarily by outdoing their 
more experienced rivals at their own game. The 
CPN(M) did use intimidation and coercion but also 
exercised great restraint in the face of the possibly 
calculated killing of fifteen of its activists. At the 
same time it demonstrated formidable organisation 
and motivation – qualities which were deservedly re-
flected in its victory. 
The vote itself and the complex parallel count went 
remarkably smoothly, with complete results (includ-
ing repolling) ready within fifteen days. Still, final re-
sults, including the approved lists of parties’ selec-
tions to fill PR seats, were published only on 8 May, 
almost a month after the election. Five by-elections, 
for seats resigned by individuals who won FPTP con-
tests from two constituencies, will probably be held 
only in September. One declared FPTP result has 
been suspended by court order following an appeal by 
the (narrow) loser. The 26 individuals nominated by 
the cabinet, who will complete the complement of 
601 CA members, have yet to be decided thanks to 
the elusiveness of the required inter-party “consensus”. 
Whatever the broad political breakdown, the CA is a 
remarkably inclusive body, far more representative of 
Nepal’s caste, ethnic, religious and regional diversity 
than any past parliament. One third of its members are 
women, catapulting the country into regional leader-
ship on gender representation. Thanks largely to the 
PR component, no fewer than 25 parties have secured 
CA seats, reflecting a kaleidoscope of ideological and 
regional or community-specific agendas. The MJF 
proved that it was more than just a brand name for a 
vague sense of Madhesi grievance but a viable political 
machine able to mobilise votes and put identity politics 
on the map – probably for the foreseeable future. 
The Maoist victory was not unsullied. The CPN(M) 
engaged in orchestrated strong-arm tactics, generally 
facing down other parties, which embraced similar 
means. Some resounding constituency results would 
have embarrassed the more modest political bosses 
who engineer realistic-looking margins of victory. 
Nevertheless, its strong showing was not manufac-
tured. Voters were willing to give credit for its strug-
gle and sacrifice, recognising that the Maoists were 
the architects of the federal republican agenda. They 
struck a chord with popular aspirations that the old 
parties had not even woken up to. In this, as in their 
more dubious techniques, they made full use of the 
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fact that they had stayed in close touch with ordinary 
people and not lost their heads in Kathmandu poli-
ticking. Meanwhile, their convincing victories in many 
urban constituencies – the CPN(M) emerged the clear 
winner in the greater Kathmandu area –demonstrated 
that they did not profit solely by preying on vulnerable 
rural voters beyond the eyes of observers. 
All in all, the elections were credible and a credit to 
those who organised, fought and voted in them. Al-
though some disruption and intimidation took place, it 
was far less than predicted. Voters were offered a 
genuine political debate and real choices. In return, 
they took their responsibilities seriously and turned 
out in large numbers to have their say. For all the los-
ers’ public petulance, very few collected evidence to 
file formal complaints. What remains is for the politi-
cal elite to digest the message that Nepal’s citizens 
have at last been allowed to send them. 
This report describes the campaign and vote, assesses 
the credibility of the election and analyses the results. 
A companion policy report published simultaneously 
surveys the new political landscape and examines the 
remaining transitional challenges. The CA has to de-
liver a functioning government, act as a legislature and 
also write a new constitution. Each of these would be 
a tough task in its own right; managing all simultane-
ously while seeing the peace process through to a sta-
ble conclusion will require further commitment and 
patience. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 3 July 2008 
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NEPAL’S ELECTION: A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION?
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal’s constituent assembly (CA) elections went 
ahead as planned on 10 April 2008, despite two post-
ponements, armed groups’ threats of disruption and 
often questionable political will.1 The Maoists emerged 
as the largest party by a clear margin, although com-
manding only just over one third of the CA seats. The 
campaign period, the vote itself and the counting pro-
ceeded far more smoothly than most observers had 
predicted; the Maoist victory also upset most predic-
tions. But the post-election period was, as expected, 
less straightforward. While the CA convened for its 
first sitting on 28 May, nearly three months after the 
election, a new government is still not in place, and 
bitter haggling over power sharing continues. 
This report offers an assessment of the election, from 
the latter days of the campaign to the completion of 
the count.2 It analyses the results, their notable features 
 
 
1 On the pre-election period and the constitutional and legal 
provisions governing the elections and the transition, see 
Crisis Group Asia Report Nº149, Nepal’s Election and Be-
yond, 2 April 2008. Other recent Crisis Group reporting in-
cludes Asia Briefings Nº72, Nepal: Peace Postponed, 18 
December 2007; and Nº68, Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, 
28 September 2007; and Asia Reports N°136, Nepal’s Trou-
bled Tarai Region, 9 July 2007; N°132, Nepal’s Maoists: 
Purists or Pragmatists?, 18 May 2007; and N°128, Nepal’s 
Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007. Full Nepali trans-
lations of all these papers are available at www.crisisgroup. 
org/nepali. 
2 During the election campaign period and the first week of 
vote counting, Crisis Group visited 40 of Nepal’s 75 districts, 
interviewing hundreds of party workers and leaders, election 
officials, administrative and security officials, journalists and 
analysts, civil society members and ordinary voters. Crisis 
Group was registered as an international election observer 
and expresses its appreciation to the Election Commission of 
Nepal, Chief Election Commissioner Bhoj Raj Pokharel, his 
colleagues and all related government officials for their co-
operation and unhindered access to polling officers, stations 
and counting centres. Crisis Group’s work was facilitated by 
the full cooperation of all parties. Notwithstanding the criti-
cal analysis in this report, Crisis Group was impressed by the 
commitment of all officials, political actors and citizens to 
making the elections a success. 
and the reasons behind them. A companion policy re-
port surveys the new political landscape and examines 
the remaining transitional challenges.3 
 
 
3 Crisis Group Asia Report Nº156, Nepal’s New Political 
Landscape, 3 July 2008.  
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II. THE CAMPAIGN 
The election campaign was vigorous, enthusiastic and 
hotly competitive; it was also marred by irregularities 
and violence, most notably the killing of many Maoist 
activists. Public enthusiasm for the process was pal-
pable, especially as the date drew closer and the pros-
pect of the polls grew more real. Dozens of parties 
were on the campaign trail, with the atmosphere boosted 
by lively media interest. Interest focused on the first-
past-the-post (FPTP) races, which came to be referred 
to in Nepali simply as the “direct” election. The tradi-
tional and best understood electoral format, it also 
lent itself far more to intense, locally driven clashes 
between named and known individuals. The shape of 
the campaign was similar to that of previous elec-
tions, with all parties using the same well-rehearsed 
techniques to take their message to the people and 
drum up support. 
The resort to dubious tactics also reflected past prece-
dents more than the particularities of the post-conflict 
environment. The campaign’s liveliness was some-
what tainted – although sometimes boosted – by mis-
behaviour. For all their repeated promises, few parties 
ever appeared likely to obey the letter of the Code of 
Conduct, nor was it likely that the Election Commis-
sion (EC) could enforce it fully.4 The campaign was 
also marred by some incidents of serious violence, in-
cluding several killings, and a general atmosphere of 
background fear. These are discussed in detail in Sec-
tion IV below. 
A. THE MAOIST MACHINE 
With hindsight, it is easy to comment that the cam-
paigns foreshadowed the results. The CPN(M)’s elec-
toral machine was formidable. No fresh observer would 
have suspected the Maoists’ lack of open electoral 
experience: in all aspects of traditional campaigning 
they adopted and refined the tools of the trade, out-
shining the other parties. They also made calculated, 
sometimes cynical, use of their military organisation: 
directly, in coordinated efforts to obstruct other par-
ties’ campaigns in particular areas (not by the PLA 
but using the PLA-trained and led Young Communist 
League (YCL)), and indirectly. Repeated warnings 
 
 
4 On the Code of Conduct, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s 
Election and Beyond, op. cit., pp. 6-7, 10, 13. 
that they could return to war in case of an unfavour-
able result served as an effective threat.5 
In all their activities, the Maoists’ main strengths were 
evident: discipline, motivation and strategic planning. 
In most of the 40 districts visited by Crisis Group, 
their cadres were more energetic and focused than 
those of other parties. This was partly the result of a 
clear policy line: they had a much more definite idea 
of their agenda than their major rivals.6 But it was 
also a triumph of organisational hard work: local ac-
tivists were trained, well managed and educated in the 
party position. “We rely on the people. The UML is 
less keen than in November, NC aren’t going to the 
villages – so how can they win?”, explained party 
spokesperson Krishna Bahadur Mahara. “The CA is 
the completion of a peaceful revolution, not a normal 
election. Completing it and establishing a republic is 
still a war. It won’t happen without struggling hard”.7 
The Maoists’ only serious policy problem during the 
campaign was their relations with other parties. Sen-
ior leaders had consistently stressed their desire for a 
broad “progressive front”. In the words of the second-
ranking party leader, Baburam Bhattarai, “what if 
we’ve been through all this struggle just for the same 
old feudal system to triumph? We need a common 
minimum agreement among the parties for progress”.8 
It appeared they would have been happy to campaign 
alongside the NC if it had enthusiastically embraced 
change. “Let the NC win, but not the old feudal can-
didates”, commented K.B. Mahara.9 As it became 
 
 
5 Speaking in his home district, Gorkha, Baburam Bhattarai 
had warned that “if we lose, there will be a new type of revo-
lution”. “A new revolution if Maoists lose the election, says 
Dr. Bhattarai”, nepalnews.com, 5 March 2008. Prachanda 
voiced similar warnings: “Due to the commitment of the 
people to build a new Nepal, I have seen that we are already 
victorious. Now, if there is any conspiracy to defeat us, we 
will not accept such defeat”. “Prachanda says Maoists won’t 
accept defeat if there is conspiracy”, nepalnews.com, 27 
March 2008. 
6 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. 
cit., p. 3. 
7 Crisis Group interview, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Kath-
mandu, 9 March 2008. 
8 Baburam Bhattarai, address to election rally, Kirtipur, 12 
March 2008. Two days later, Bhattarai expressed greater 
frustration: “We’re feeling sick about [the NC and UML’s] 
mindset. After all the sacrifice and the people’s movement, 
they’re back to low politicking”. However, he still insisted 
that “there has to be a coalition government through the 
[post-election] transitional phase. The major parties should 
agree on consensual democracy”. Crisis Group interview, 
Kathmandu, 14 March 2008.  
9 Crisis Group interview, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Kath-
mandu, 9 March 2008. 
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clear that the only realistic alliance could be with 
other leftists, primarily the UML, Maoist frustration 
with that party’s refusal to play ball erupted in public.  
Speaking at a meeting to launch Maoist leader Prachan-
da’s campaign in his Kathmandu constituency, Bhat-
tarai voiced this disappointment: “Let’s compete by 
all means but why can’t we have a basic consensus on 
the main issues?….It’s sad that even republicans and 
leftists couldn’t unite – of course we’re sad about 
that”.10 Prachanda himself warned that “without unity 
I see a very bad situation emerging – outside forces 
and others are conspiring to disrupt the elections and 
undermine our sovereignty”.11 Ironically, the failure to 
form an alliance strongly benefited the Maoists, who 
crushed the UML in the FPTP contests. 
Although one constituent of the CPN(M), the United 
People’s Front led by Bhattarai, had competed in the 
1991 elections and emerged in third place with nine 
parliamentarians (out of 205), this was in effect the 
Maoists’ first real electoral battle. Their view that it 
was a continuation of war by other means – publicly 
expressed and internally institutionalised – made 
sense. This did not mean that they saw it as a test of 
armed force (although they did resort to some milita-
ristic means, described below), but that it required the 
same commitment to strategy and tactics as had their 
insurgency. They calibrated their “mass line” politics 
to the demands of a national election with the mix of 
strategic firmness and tactical flexibility with which 
they had pursued the armed conflict. Above all, they 
demonstrated their ability to learn and adapt. 
B. THE STUTTERING CHALLENGE 
For their opponents, the picture was more mixed. The 
NC and UML had not lost their vast national net-
works, nor were they actively stalling the progress 
towards elections. They went through the formalities 
of campaigning with the ease that their years of prac-
tice afforded them. But many of their activists seemed 
demoralised and poorly motivated, while some may 
have been actively working for their opponents. 
The NC in particular was harmed by its unclear policy 
stance and unhealed divisions. Its decision to adopt a 
republican line was deeply unpopular with a large sec-
tion of senior leaders and some local activists. Many of 
them, including the prime minister’s daughter, waged 
an acrimonious public campaign against their own 
 
 
10 Baburam Bhattarai, address to election rally, Kirtipur, 12 
March 2008. 
11 Prachanda, address to election rally, Kirtipur, 12 March 2008. 
party policy throughout the campaign. Others were 
happy to express their disappointment in the party 
leadership: “The government is useless. There is no 
government”, lamented former NC Home Minister 
Govinda Raj Joshi.12 
The distribution of candidate “tickets” within the 
party revealed the depths of continuing rifts between 
the members of the mother party and the former splin-
ter, the NC(D), which had supposedly reunited in 
September 2007. The two factions of the party de-
voted much time and energy to haggling over seat al-
locations, eventually agreeing a 60:40 division.13 
Ironically, many of the senior individuals humiliated 
by not being offered the chance to stand for FPTP 
seats later realised how lucky they were to have 
avoided the FPTP slaughter and to have slipped in on 
the proportional representation (PR) list, which they 
had earlier seen as ignominious. 
The UML faced similar problems in accommodating 
its established leaders, suffering some resignations 
from office bearers unhappy at perceived slights.14 It 
did not face a debilitating factional split but had to 
cope with serious differences over relations with the 
Maoists. Some argued in favour of a broad leftist alli-
ance, or at least a concrete seat-sharing deal; the win-
ners of the argument were those who argued instead 
to stick closer to the NC, as a fellow mainstream 
party, and fight the Maoists head-on. This decision 
pleased foreign governments and some activists on 
the ground. Most leaders only realised after the elec-
tions how badly they had miscalculated. Two days be-
fore the poll, one UML minister still argued that the 
Maoists had shot themselves in the foot: “We offered 
to let four or five of their leaders through unopposed, 
but they called it a conspiracy and refused”.15 The NC 
was also convinced the UML was their main rival and 
 
 
12 Crisis Group interview, Damauli, 8 April 2008. 
13 At the end of January, when the Maoists’ preparations 
were well underway, senior NC leaders were still busy run-
ning round the country trying to negotiate truces between the 
two halves of the party and appoint party officials below the 
district president level. Crisis Group interview, Prakash Sha-
ran Mahat, Biratnagar, 24 January 2008.  
14 Pre-poll arguments over the PR lists and post-poll disputes 
over the selection of winning candidates led to many resig-
nations. See Section V.A(4). 
15 Crisis Group interview, Prithvi Subba Gurung, Lamjung, 8 
April 2008. Minister Gurung did manage to win his own 
seat, Lamjung-2, so his comments could have been coloured 
by his party’s strength in his constituency, where the main 
battle was with the NC. The Maoists were more active in 
Lamjung-1, to the east of the Marsyangdi River, a seat they 
won. Crisis Group interviews, UML and NC activists, Besi-
sahar, 8 April 2008. 
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in many districts encouraged voters to vote for the 
CPN(M) if they wanted a “real” leftist party – a 
tactic that backfired and may have further weak-
ened the UML. 
The Maoists benefited from their novelty value – for 
many voters the chance to see their leaders was a 
draw – and from their large pool of passionate and 
persuasive speakers. The NC and UML suffered from 
parallel weaknesses: most of their prominent cam-
paigners were well-known faces that the public had 
grown tired of.16 While Prachanda and top Maoists 
travelled almost constantly, NC President G.P. Koirala 
did not visit a single constituency on campaign busi-
ness or address a mass meeting.17 Acting President 
Sushil Koirala was largely confined to his own con-
stituency, as he fought a losing battle to save his seat. 
The NC’s biggest crowd pullers were the charismatic 
student leader Gagan Thapa and popular speaker 
Pradip Giri; Shankar Pokharel emerged as one of the 
UML’s most effective performers. However, the fact 
that these individuals did not rank high in their party 
hierarchies undermined their individual efforts. 
Where the Maoists were tireless in pamphleting and 
door-to-door canvassing, the NC and UML appeared 
less keen to meet the people. It was partly that they 
were just too late: the NC’s campaign did not kick off 
until the third week of March (and even then many 
party officials remained sceptical that the election 
would take place), while the UML held back because 
it was (falsely) confident of its mass base and did not 
want to lose face if the elections were postponed once 
it had launched its campaign, as had nearly been the 
case for the earlier scheduled November 2007 date. 
When the party finally got started, its cadres were 
poorly motivated. As some villagers observed, while 
the Maoists worked all day on a diet of fruit squash 
and beaten rice, the NC and UML cadres would not 
move until they were fed with meat and rice.18 When 
candidates and leaders did try to revive their connec-
tion with voters, they often found themselves faced 
with tricky questions about their past performance 
and future agenda. 
 
 
16 In selecting candidates, the NC gave priority to winners 
from the 1999 general election, more or less guaranteeing a 
large proportion of old faces. 
17 This was largely because of his ill health, although he also 
claimed that he felt the prime minister and acting head of 
state should not engage in party campaigning. 
18 Crisis Group interview, villagers, Kabhrepalanchowk, 15 
May 2008. 
C. THE MADHESIS PARTIES: MOTIVATION 
AMID MUTUAL SUSPICION 
By the time the campaign kicked off, the wind of 
change in the Madhes was clear to all – although per-
haps not clear enough to the established parties. Al-
though the leaders of the Madhesi movement had 
agreed to a slightly nebulous compromise deal fol-
lowing their February 2008 agitation,19 they had so-
lidified a widespread sentiment that only new leader-
ship would force Kathmandu to address Madhesi 
issues. Still, it was unclear which parties would bene-
fit the most from this heightened awareness. 
The Madhes Janadhikar Forum (MJF) had spear-
headed the first Madhesi movement in early 2007 and 
had built a powerful brand name. However, its organ-
isational capacity was widely questioned, as were the 
changeable policies of its mercurial chief, Upendra 
Yadav, who thrived on his skill of being all things to 
all people. The newly established Tarai-Madhes De-
mocratic Party (TMDP) was launched in December 
2007 by senior NC leader Mahant Thakur as a more 
moderate, “establishment” front, but it had little time 
to put down roots despite apparent assistance from 
New Delhi. The NSP faction led by Rajendra Mahato, 
the outcome of a long series of splits and disagree-
ments, offered a perhaps not decisive enough break 
from the mother party, which many Madhesis felt had 
achieved little in its long years of supposedly pushing 
regional interests. In the end, the MJF not only turned 
its brand into a viable campaign machine but also 
proved that its much criticised calculation not to ally 
with the TMDP and NSP was right, at least in terms 
of its own party fortunes. 
The enthusiasm of many Madhesi voters was palpa-
ble, both during the campaign and as the counts con-
tinued.20 There was no shortage of political experi-
ence across the Tarai, which had historically been the 
hotbed of Nepali politics, although threats by armed 
groups active in the eastern districts had inhibited 
voter awareness and party canvassing efforts.21 There 
were some communal tinges to the campaign but far 
less than at the peak of the Madhesi movement, when 
there were widespread threats against hill-origin pa-
hadis in the Tarai. Most leaders were responsible; 
 
 
19 The protests started from 19 January 2008, escalated to an 
indefinite strike from 13 February and led to an eight-point 
agreement on 28 February. See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s 
Election and Beyond, op. cit., p. 2. 
20 Crisis Group interviews, Banke and Bardiya, 2-3 April 
2008; Bara, Parsa, Siraha and Dhanusha, 12-13 April 2008. 
21 On the history of political activity in the Tarai, see Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
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some, such as Mahant Thakur, made dedicated efforts 
to rid the Madhesi agenda of anti-pahadi overtones. 
Nevertheless, the hangover of the past violence and 
unwillingness to allow the new Madhesi parties an 
easy victory probably drove more pahadis towards 
the Maoists, whom they saw as likely the strongest 
defenders of their interests.  
The Madhesi parties were also greatly helped by the 
NC and UML’s decision to put up many unpopular 
old pahadi faces in Tarai FPTP seats. Headline clashes, 
in particular Upendra Yadav taking on the prime min-
ister’s daughter, Sujata Koirala, enlivened the campaign 
and boosted interest – as well as leading to much bad 
blood and occasional confrontations. The major dis-
appointment of the Madhesi parties’ campaign was 
their disdain for women, Dalit and minority candi-
dates (see below). 
D. THE LEGACY OF CONFLICT 
The elections took place under the shadow of the con-
flict, and in many areas its history shaped relations 
between the parties, as well as voters’ attitudes. Dhad-
ing district, immediately west of Kathmandu, saw 
more violence than any other hill district.22 In eight-
een pre-election clashes, 82 people were injured, six-
teen of them in a March incident, when incumbent 
UML parliamentarian Rajendra Prasad Pandey was 
campaigning.23 The district headquarters was put un-
der a curfew on 8 April following NC-UML fighting, 
and there was also a bomb blast outside a polling sta-
tion on election day.24 
This violence did not erupt randomly. Dhading had 
experienced some of the worst brutality of the con-
flict. More than five dozen of its residents, allegedly 
disappeared by the security forces, remain unaccounted 
for. Maoist organisers in Jivanpur, who were accused 
of a deliberate attack on Rajendra Pandey’s campaign 
meeting, insisted that the UML itself should take the 
blame for the incident: 
 
 
22 According to the most comprehensive survey, the 23 vio-
lent incidents in Dhading were outnumbered only by the 
eastern Tarai districts of Saptari and Sunsari (with 26 and 24 
incidents respectively). In terms of pre-election incidents, 
Dhading had the worst record in the whole country. “Elec-
tion and Political Violence in Nepal: Final Report, Novem-
ber 26, 2007 to April 30, 2008”, Democracy and Election 
Alliance Nepal (DEAN), Kathmandu, 19 June 2008. 
23 Ibid, p. 22. DEAN reported that five other incidents in 
Dhading involved the UML and Maoists. 
24 Ibid, p. 37. 
Five people were disappeared from this village 
alone – by the army but on the instruction of the 
UML. The local committee of the families of the 
disappeared has simply tried to present a petition to 
Rajendra Pandey demanding an investigation into 
the fate of their relatives. He refused to even speak 
to them, and instead the police attacked them with-
out provocation.25 
Families of the disappeared confirmed this story (as 
did UML supporters who had also fallen victim to the 
indiscriminate police beatings), although it was clear 
that the CPN(M) was the guiding force behind the pe-
tition and had prepared itself for a clash.26 In any case, 
these disappearances only took place after the Maoists 
had launched their own campaign for political domi-
nance in Dhading by killing some twelve UML vil-
lage officials and chasing others out of the district. 
Rajendra Pandey pointed out that he himself was un-
der arrest during the period of royal rule, when the 
army abducted suspected Maoist cadres, so could 
hardly be accused of orchestrating disappearances. He 
observed: “Some form of peace may be restored, but 
the social fabric has been so badly torn during the 
conflict that we will never see a return to true peace 
and harmony”.27 
Other patterns of campaign violence were also col-
oured by deep-seated antipathies dating back to the 
early years of the conflict. In Tanahun district, hard-
line former NC Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi 
complained of systematic assaults by Maoist cadres 
on his party workers.28 His opponent, senior CPN(M) 
leader Suresh Ale Magar, did not deny responsibility 
for some incidents: 
Our party line is retaliation, so we will not be 
Gandhis and just turn the other cheek. But at the 
same time we will not initiate any violence. In the 
neighbouring constituency, we’ve run a perfectly 
peaceful campaign against [NC Peace and Recon-
struction minister] Ramchandra Poudel, because 
he himself has good political culture and has 
played by the rules. But here we’ve had to respond 
to the NC’s deliberate use of hired thugs, who 
have been brought in from outside the district to 
try to steal the election by force.29 
 
 
25 Crisis Group interview, local CPN(M) official, Jivanpur, 
27 March 2008. 
26 Crisis Group interviews, Jivanpur, 27 March 2008. 
27 Crisis Group interview, Rajendra Prasad Pandey and cam-
paign team, Malekhu, 9 April 2008. 
28 Crisis Group interview, Damauli, 8 April 2008. 
29 Crisis Group interview, Tanahun, 8 April 2008. 
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The many clashes in Dhading and Tanahun offer no 
black and white picture of guilty and innocent parties. 
They do, however, illustrate the corrosive effect of 
years of armed conflict, unresolved grievances and tit-
for-tat retaliation. Under such circumstances, it is 
hardly surprising that competition was sometimes bit-
ter. It is perhaps more remarkable that the painful leg-
acy of conflict did not prompt a greater number of 
violent incidents. 
III. THE VOTE 
A. THE TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT 
The Election Commission (EC) proved itself to be 
well organised and well motivated.30 Polling stations 
were generally well managed and election staff (EC 
employees, civil servants on secondment, volunteer 
educators and security personnel) performed their du-
ties enthusiastically.31 Election officials appeared well 
briefed and generally confident in their dealings with 
local party candidates and workers throughout the 
campaign period. They often admitted, however, that 
the election Code of Conduct was overambitious and 
that they received limited complaints about the more 
egregious violations. Some district election officers 
did insist on parties removing outlawed graffiti and 
held them to the ban on campaign tactics such as mo-
torcycle rallies, but most were more lenient.32 
Despite the serious logistical challenges, all necessary 
materials reached the nearly 10,000 polling locations 
on time.33 Sensitive materials, primarily the ballot pa-
pers themselves, were transported and stored under 
effective security guard. Election officials appeared 
well briefed. The training of temporary staff, mostly 
central and local government officials, was systematic 
and generally well managed.34 The electoral roll 
caused some difficulties: in some polling stations it 
took voters a long time to identify themselves, while 
others complained that their names had been omitted 
even though they had participated in previous elec-
tions. Lax identification procedures also made it eas-
ier for illegal proxy votes to be cast in the names of 
 
 
30 Crisis Group interviewed election officials in twenty 
districts. 
31 In several locations, Crisis Group visited election offices 
well outside normal office hours to find them fully staffed 
with officials of all levels working against the clock to com-
plete preparations on time. Similarly, many counting stations 
operated round the clock on a shift-work basis. 
32 Crisis Group witnessed minor infringements of the Code 
of Conduct in every district visited during the campaign pe-
riod. Most common was graffiti (although some District 
Election Officers (DEOs), such as those in Baglung, Myagdi 
and Syangja, had persuaded the parties to keep district head-
quarters relatively free of wall-painting or to remove earlier 
graffiti). Most DEOs reported that they had urged parties 
many times to abide by the rules, but earnest vows to coop-
erate had rarely translated into action. Crisis Group inter-
views, various districts, March-April 2008. 
33 There were 20,866 polling booths in 9,788 centres. See Cri-
sis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit., p. 8. 
34 Crisis Group observed training sessions for polling officers 
in various districts, from Dolakha to Palpa. 
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others. Nevertheless, such complaints appear to have 
been fewer than in past elections. 
Security arrangements for the vote were in line with 
plans and generally low key. The relatively small 
number of police available for each location did, 
however, mean that they were often outnumbered by 
party agents and vulnerable to pressure tactics. Politi-
cal parties had made great efforts to have their own 
workers recruited as temporary police – “the parties 
keep calling up trying to persuade us to accept their 
cadres”, complained a police superintendent35 – but 
the partisanship of temporary recruits did not lead to 
significant complaints. Overall, party workers and or-
dinary voters shared a high opinion of the technical 
management of the election, many of them comment-
ing that these were the best managed elections Nepal 
had ever had.36 
B. THE VOTE ITSELF 
Across the country the vote largely started on time at 
7am, with many voters queuing before the polls 
opened. In a handful of places, minor disputes de-
layed the opening of polls by a few hours. The major-
ity of those who cast ballots did so well before the 
polls closed at 5pm. By noon, the EC announced that 
turnout had reached almost 50 per cent; by mid-
afternoon, polling stations in Bhaktapur and Kath-
mandu were almost deserted. Three people were 
killed on the day itself, including an independent can-
didate for Sarlahi-6, Shambhu Prasad Singh, who was 
shot in the evening by unidentified gunmen.37 How-
ever, violent incidents and deaths were far fewer than 
in previous elections. 
Turnout was high given the circumstances but slightly 
lower than in past general elections.38 There were 
slight differences in the FPTP (61.7 per cent) and PR 
(63.3 per cent) figures: although most voters partici-
pated in both races as part of the same procedure, 
government officials, security personnel and Maoist 
PLA members were enrolled as “temporary” voters 
and only allowed to vote in the PR race.39 The early 
 
 
35 Crisis Group interview, Nepalgunj, 4 April 2008. 
36 Crisis Group interviews, various districts, 10-17 April 2008. 
37 “Independent candidate gunned down in Sarlahi”, nepal-
news.com, 10 April 2008. 
38 Voter turnout was 65.15 per cent in 1991, 61.86 per cent in 
1994 and 65.79 per cent in 1999. Election Commission of 
Nepal at www.election.gov.np/EN/prevelection.html. On turn-
out as a benchmark, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Elec-
tion and Beyond, op. cit., p 7. 
39 On temporary voters, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s 
Election and Beyond, op. cit., p. 11. 
and high participation suggested enthusiasm – as well 
as perhaps some organised rigging. There were sig-
nificant regional and local variations. Many Tarai 
constituencies, where it had been feared that the 
threats of armed disruption would scare voters away, 
saw turnout crossing 65 per cent.  
Many remote districts, especially in the west, had more 
than 70 per cent turnout – all such areas recording re-
sounding Maoist victories.40 In isolated Dolpa, 79.9 
per cent of 21,932 registered voters took part, while 
nearby Manang, won by Maoist minister Dev Prasad 
Gurung, had only 40.1 per cent participation. In urban 
areas, Bhaktapur stood out with 74.3 per cent turnout 
– and voters awarding both seats to the locally based 
NWPP, one of the smallest members of the seven-
party governing coalition.41 
Many migrants to urban areas returned to their home 
villages to vote – often assisted by the Maoists pro-
viding free transport. But probably even more were 
unable to vote. A majority of the dozens of migrants 
in Kathmandu interviewed by Crisis Group reported 
they could not, mainly because of the time and money 
it would have cost to reach their permanent addresses; 
of those who did vote, many were from relatively ac-
cessible nearby districts.42 Hundreds of thousands 
(possibly as many as 2.5 million) of Nepalis working 
abroad did not get to vote, although the major parties 
did mobilise their long-standing organisations in India 
to persuade some supporters to return to take part.  
These figures go some way to explaining the lower 
than usual turnout, although anecdotal evidence sug-
gests many absent voters had their votes cast by party 
agents. Several hundred thousand young adults were 
excluded because the cut-off date for the electoral roll 
 
 
40 Voter turnout: Kalikot 70.6 per cent, Dolpa 79.9 per cent, 
Mugu 75.4 per cent, Jumla 71 per cent and Humla 79.7 per 
cent. See “Winning Candidates of FPTP by Constituency” at 
http://result.nepalelectionportal.org/report.html. 
41 In this report, the term “seven parties” refers to the govern-
ing coalition of six parliamentary parties and the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist, CPN(M)). The “six parties” are the 
continuation of the Seven-Party Alliance, whose member-
ship was reduced when the Nepali Congress and Nepali 
Congress (Democratic), NC(D), reunited. Past Crisis Group 
reporting referred to this alliance as the SPA, a term that is 
now widely used to refer to the six plus the CPN(M) – al-
though there is no “alliance” binding them. The six parties 
are the Nepali Congress (NC); Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
(Anandidevi, NSP(A)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal Workers 
and Peasants Party (NWPP); and United Left Front (ULF). 
42 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 10-12 April and May 
2008. 
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was mid-November 2006.43 There are no separate sta-
tistics on the turnout of women,44 nor breakdowns by 
any other category, although party agents carefully 
noted who was voting, so the more organised ones 
could do their own analysis. 
C. DID VOTERS KNOW WHAT  
THEY WERE DOING? 
Statistics alone cannot demonstrate the level of voter 
understanding. However, the high turnout and the low 
number of spoiled ballots (5.2 per cent in the FPTP 
race and 3.7 per cent in the PR45) suggest much 
greater awareness than sceptical observers had antici-
pated.46 Any wasted ballots are disappointing, and in 
some constituencies the number of spoiled ballots was 
 
 
43 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. 
cit., p. 11. 
44 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) reported that 53 per cent of voters were women, 
on the basis of counts by various international observers at 
over 500 polling stations. “Constituent Assembly Elections 
of 10 April 2008: Summary of Human Rights Monitoring”, 
OHCHR-Nepal, 18 June 2008, p. 5. However, international 
observers caution that their counts were not systematic so 
specific figures are unlikely to be accurate. Crisis Group in-
terviews, international observers, Kathmandu, May-June 2008. 
45 Tarai districts, especially those in the east, saw the highest 
levels of invalid votes. Saptari had the worst record, with 
three of its six constituencies having over 9 per cent rejected 
ballots (and 8.1 per cent across the district) in the FPTP race. 
In the PR race, Saptari-2 had 9.3 per cent rejected ballots, the 
highest nationwide. Whereas Saptari also witnessed high 
turnout, the district with the lowest number of invalid votes 
(Manang, at 2.1 per cent) had only 40.1 per cent turnout. See 
“Constituency-wise Total Voters, Casted Vote, Valid Vote, 
Invalid Vote and its Percentage in PR Election System” and 
“Constituency-wise Total Voters, Casted Vote, Valid Vote, 
Invalid Vote and its Percentage in FPTP Election System”, 
Election Commission of Nepal, 6 May 2008, at www. 
election.gov.np. For useful maps indicating the regional varia-
tions in spoiled ballots, see http://result.nepalelectionportal. 
org/maps.html. 
46 The largest pre-election survey cautioned: “Only a small 
proportion of people have heard about the issues raised by 
the political parties such as federal state, proportional elec-
toral system, etc. Likewise, only a small proportion under-
stand what a constituent assembly election is”. Sudhindra 
Sharma and Pawan Kumar Sen, “Nepal Contemporary Po-
litical Situation V: Nationwide Opinion Survey”, Interdisci-
plinary Analysts, Kathmandu, March 2008, p. 67. Fieldwork 
carried out in December 2007 and early January 2008 found 
that 67 per cent of respondents had heard of the CA but only 
21 per cent correctly understood it. On an earlier survey in 
this series and the narrow definition of “correct” understand-
ing, see Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace, op. 
cit., p. 37, fn. 360. 
greater than the winning margin. Nevertheless, the 
figures are respectable given the complexity of the 
parallel system and the uncertain circumstances of the 
vote.47 The sheer number of parties which were only 
represented on ballot papers by sometimes similar-
looking symbols (such as the various combinations of 
hammers, sickles and stars for numerous communist 
parties) made the voters’ task more arduous. 
Voters interviewed at polling stations generally indi-
cated a strong understanding of both the purpose of 
the election and the technicalities of the procedure. 
They were guided by officials and party agents (le-
gitimately present inside the entrance of the stations) 
and most had plenty of time to observe those ahead of 
them in the long queues going through the various 
steps: from identification, marking of a fingernail 
with indelible ink to prevent multiple voting, issuing 
of the FPTP paper and voting to the second step of 
receiving, marking and casting the PR ballot. An ex-
periment with electronic voting, in Kathmandu-1, 
was a resounding success, with no lost votes and a 
prompt result.48 
The EC itself had run countrywide 45-day voter edu-
cation campaigns, with district offices training and 
deploying volunteers, mainly schoolteachers, to all 
villages in their district. While some district election 
officers (DEOs) and volunteers reported sporadic dif-
ficulties, and some party workers suggested they had 
not been as assiduous in their campaign as the parties 
had in canvassing, the effort appears to have been 
successful. EC programs were complemented by civil 
society efforts, intense media coverage and the par-
ties’ own communication with voters. Some DEOs 
reported that the UN mission (UNMIN) District Elec-
 
 
47 By comparison, the 2007 Scottish parliament elections, 
which also used a (different but equally complex) combina-
tion of constituency contests and regional PR races, saw 4.28 
per cent rejected constituency ballots and 3 per cent rejected 
regional ballots. “Rejected ballots at the 3 May Scottish Par-
liamentary Elections”, UK Electoral Commission, 13 June 
2007, at www.electoralcommission.org.uk/templates/search/ 
document.cfm/19604. One study suggested social depriva-
tion and the number of parties on the regional lists were fac-
tors in the high number of spoiled ballots. Christopher Car-
man and James Mitchell, “An Examination of Ballot Rejec-
tion in the Scottish Parliamentary Election of 2007”, Depart-
ment of Government, Strathclyde University, at http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/25_06_07_rejectedballots.pdf. 
London’s 2008 mayoral elections, which used a transferable 
vote system, saw 1.7 per cent spoiled first choice votes and 
16.8 per cent spoiled second votes. http://results.londonelects. 
org.uk/Results/MayoralResult.aspx. 
48 See “Winning Candidates of FPTP by Constituency”, at 
http://result.nepalelectionportal.org/report.html. 
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tion Advisers (UN volunteers, one of whom was de-
ployed to each district) boosted their enthusiasm for 
the awareness campaign and generally added to their 
confidence in election preparations, as much by their 
moral support as any technical assistance.49 
D. REPOLLING 
Polling was postponed or suspended in 106 stations, 
belonging to 21 constituencies across twelve dis-
tricts.50 Seventy-seven of these were in Surkhet-1, 
whose voting was suspended after the pre-election 
killing of the UML candidate. Other suspensions were 
caused by events on the day itself, primarily efforts to 
capture booths or clashes between rival party activ-
ists. The number is a tiny proportion of the total 
20,866 booths – around 0.5 per cent. Repolling in all 
booths took place successfully within nine days of the 
original election date, being completed with the 19 
April Surkhet-1 election. Well-informed observers 
had expected a far greater number of suspensions and 
potentially serious logistical and security challenges 
in managing reruns.51 The reality was far less prob-
lematic – a testament to surprisingly good party be-
haviour, weak disruptive efforts by armed groups and 
the EC’s high organisational capacity. 
 
 
49 Crisis Group interviews, various locations including Parbat 
and Dhading, April 2008. 
50 Election Commission of Nepal, at http://election.gov.np/ 
EN/detail_news.php?id=128. 
51 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. 
cit., p. 16. 
IV. WAS IT FREE AND FAIR? 
A. THE ATMOSPHERE 
The verdict of national and international election ob-
servers was remarkably positive – especially given 
that many of the national observers were directly or 
indirectly linked to the UML and NC and primed to 
criticise any Maoist misbehaviour. Only a few hours 
after the polls opened, the most prominent observer, 
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, declared the 
election “revolutionary”.52 This set the tone for other 
early comments and may have encouraged some of 
the national observers to hurry out their preliminary 
findings.53 One large national network observed on 11 
April that “the momentous elections to the much-
awaited Constituent Assembly have been conducted 
in Nepal in accordance with the internationally ac-
cepted norms and standards”.54 
For the EU, the election was “a crucial step towards 
an inclusive democracy in Nepal and has so far met 
several international standards”, although its observ-
ers noted that “the campaign period was tense across 
the country and marred by incidents of intimidation 
and violence”.55 The Asian Network for Free Elections 
(ANFREL), described the election as “largely success-
ful and credible”, stating that “[t]he overall integrity of 
the election will be upheld provided that the counting 
of ballots is conducted well and grievances are appro-
priately resolved, including through re-polling”.56  
 
 
52 Manesh Shrestha, “Three dead in Nepal vote violence”  
at www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/04/10/nepal.election/ 
index.html. The Carter Center’s official press statement,  
12 April 2008, is at www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/nepal_prelim 
_041208.html. 
53 Some were already planning prompt initial statements; see 
Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit., 
pp. 14-15. Nevertheless, Jimmy Carter’s high profile, his 
across-the-board acceptability (while winning the Maoists’ 
trust he is still fondly remembered by NC activists for having 
written to King Birendra urging the release of NC leader 
B.P. Koirala for health treatment while he was president) and 
the Carter Center’s lengthy continued presence in Nepal 
meant that his comments were given much greater attention 
than those of other observers. 
54 “Statement of Preliminary Observation”, National Election 
Observation Committee (NEOC), Kathmandu, 11 April 2008. 
55 “Largely successful election day despite tense campaign 
marks step towards inclusive democracy”, EU Election Ob-
servation Mission statement, Kathmandu, 12 April 2008. 
56 “Credible Elections Advance Nepal’s Peace Process”, 
ANFREL statement, Kathmandu, 12 April 2008. 
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The polls themselves were professionally managed 
and the atmosphere on the day was very good – many 
people commented that these were probably the best 
run elections Nepal has ever held.57 Nevertheless, the 
environment was far from perfect. There was back-
ground fear and intimidation and all major parties en-
gaged in irregularities. In particular, the Maoists used 
calibrated threats, from ominous warnings of a possi-
ble return to conflict to various low-profile, local tactics 
to encourage/coerce people to vote for them. Some of 
these efforts appeared deliberate and carefully orches-
trated. For example, they deployed PLA soldiers out-
side the cantonments early in the campaign to remind 
people of their military capacity but ensured they were 
all inside well before the day itself. 
B. DISRUPTION, INTIMIDATION  
AND CHEATING 
The Maoists made systematic efforts to disrupt other 
parties’ campaigns in particular areas, but there were 
many clashes with no Maoist involvement.58 The 
Maoists appear to have adopted a strategic approach 
to disruptive activity: securing their heartlands, de-
ploying additional activists to contested constituencies 
and using local displays of force as a tool in national-
level negotiations, in particular while pressing the 
UML for an electoral alliance.59 The CPN(M) consis-
tently obstructed royalist parties and also responded 
strongly to what it claimed were UML and NC efforts 
to harass its own workers.  
The NC and UML demonstrated that the Maoists 
were far from the only guilty party. To cite only two 
examples verified by Crisis Group in the final days of 
the campaign: NC/UML clashes in Lamjung district 
led to serious injuries and bitter recriminations on 
 
 
57 Crisis Group interviews, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur and Kath-
mandu districts, 10 April 2008. 
58 The most comprehensive survey of political and election-
related violence was carried out by the Democracy and Elec-
tion Alliance Nepal (DEAN). It recorded 485 violent inci-
dents, involving 50 deaths, between 26 November 2007 and 
30 April 2008. “Election and Political Violence in Nepal”, 
op. cit. 
59 It was certainly the impression of UML workers that Mao-
ist attacks were linked to downturns in the talks for an alli-
ance. “Every time our leaders say we don’t need an alliance 
on their [the Maoists’] terms, they attack us. It seems they’re 
just desperate”, commented one of several dozen UML and 
ANNFSU (student wing) activists who had been prevented 
from holding a planned rally in Mainapokhari by some 200-
300 YCL cadres, whom they claimed had been brought in 
from surrounding districts. Crisis Group interviews, Nayapul 
(Tamakoshi), Dolakha, 28 March 2008. 
both sides;60 an NC/UML confrontation in Dhading’s 
district headquarters forced the authorities to impose a 
curfew to contain the violence.61 There were frequent, 
credible, allegations that certain NC and UML candi-
dates had brought in hired thugs to support their cam-
paigns.62 There was a spike in abductions in the days 
before the polls, with the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) receiving reports 
of 28 abductions in the 6-9 April period, 22 of them 
reportedly carried out by the CPN(M). Most abductees 
were only held for a few hours; some were handed 
over to police, accused of electoral malpractices, with 
their captors claiming they had carried out citizens’ 
arrests rather than kidnapping.63 
Apart from open violence, all major parties engaged 
in underhand tactics to boost their vote. The Maoists 
were only exceptional in the dedication, scale and suc-
cess of their efforts – one example of their “main-
streaming”. Many of the most effective ways of influ-
encing the vote are relatively invisible but require 
significant organisational investment. Possibly the most 
significant irregularity (although there is not nearly 
enough solid evidence to evaluate these trends with 
certainty) was unauthorised proxy voting, sometimes in 
the name of voters who were actually present but es-
pecially in the names of migrants whose names were 
on the roll but could not turn up to vote themselves.64 
Proxy voting is not new, and several parties appear to 
have engaged in it, but only the Maoists had the ca-
pacity to invest major resources in visiting households 
in advance of the election to check up on how many 
voters would be present and to cross-check this against 
the electoral roll. One Maoist cadre from Sindhu-
palchowk-2 claimed he himself had cast 150 proxy 
votes in his constituency.65 The fielding of “dummy 
candidates”66 may not have made much difference dur-
ing the campaign but proved its utility on the day, 
when these candidates’ agents were able to be present 
 
 
60 Crisis Group interviews, NC and UML district officials and 
UML activists injured in clashes, Lamjung, 8 April 2008. 
61 Crisis Group interviews, party workers, administrative and 
security officials, Dhading, 9 April 2008. 
62 Crisis Group interviews, Tanahun, Dhading, Lamjung dis-
tricts, March-April 2008. 
63 “Constituent Assembly Elections”, OHCHR-Nepal, op. 
cit., p. 3. 
64 For example, a Kathmandu-based journalist reported how 
she discovered that someone had voted in her name in her 
home district, “and I can guess which party it would have been 
for”. Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 29 April 2008. 
65 Crisis Group interview, Maoist cadre, Kathmandu, 2 May 
2008. 
66 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. 
cit., p. 14. 
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inside polling stations to assist their true parties.67 
There were probably many campaign financing ir-
regularities as well, but it is unlikely these will ever 
be fully investigated.68 
It could be that widespread expectations of serious 
violence reduced observers’ sensitivity to lower-level 
and less-visible cheating. To some extent, the physi-
cal security of election materials was also a diversion: 
except in a very few cases rigging attempts were more 
subtle than attacks on ballot boxes. Some efforts took 
place before polling day. Election officers in Lalitpur-
3 and Ramechhap-2 told a television reporter that they 
were asked to sign some ballot papers before the polls 
opened (they are meant to be signed individually be-
fore being handed to a verified voter).69 In one case, 
the EC took action against a polling officer in Saptari 
district for allowing the use of PR ballot papers with-
out his signature.70 Some party workers distributed in-
centives to voters, such as money, liquor and meat.71 
C. KILLINGS 
Maoists were the principal victims of political violence 
but also instigated the most orchestrated low-level har-
assment. Apart from eight of their activists who were 
killed in the opening weeks of the campaign,72 seven 
party workers were shot dead by an armed police de-
tail guarding NC candidate Khum Bahadur Khadka in 
Dang district on 8 April. Although initial reports sug-
 
 
67 Crisis Group met some such agents – including two who 
could not even remember the name of the candidate they 
were supposed to be representing. Crisis Group interviews, 
Lalitpur district, 10 April 2008. 
68 Only 26 of 54 parties contesting the elections submitted 
their expenditure details as directed. “26 parties furnish poll 
expenditure details at EC”, The Kathmandu Post, 12 June 
2008. Of those that have (including the three largest parties), 
the accounts are clean, probably suspiciously so. Accusa-
tions of dubious accounting have followed party lines. For a 
UML perspective on alleged NC and CPN(M) malpractice, 
see Bhadra Sharma, “Maovadi ra kangresdvara nakkali khar-
cha pesh”, Budhabar, 18 June 2006. 
69 Crisis Group interview, Ajaybabu Shiwakoti, Kathmandu, 
18 April 2008. 
70 The EC directed Saptari district’s chief returning officer to 
take departmental action (ie, an internal disciplinary meas-
ure) against Amarendra Kumar Yadav, a polling officer in 
Dadha village, for allowing the use of unsigned PR ballot 
papers and ordered a repoll. EC press briefing, 12 April, 
2008, at http://election.gov.np/EN/detail_news.php?id=127. 
71 For example, Crisis Group witnessed CPN(M) workers 
distributing chiura (beaten rice) and sugar just 100 metres 
outside a polling station in Nuwakot-3 during repolling, 17 
April 2008. 
72 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit. 
gested they had launched an assault, and the police 
were responding in self-defence, subsequent accounts 
suggested this was not the case.73 An inquiry was 
launched but has yet to report. It was good fortune 
that Maoist leader Krishna Bahadur Mahara arrived 
quickly on the scene to urge restraint. 
On the eve of the election, UML candidate Rishi 
Prasad Sharma was shot dead in Surkhet district, also 
by security personnel deployed with an NC leader, 
Purna Bahadur Khadka. The Surkhet-1 constituency 
election had to be postponed but these killings were 
not the much-feared harbingers of election-day blood-
shed.74 The day itself was remarkably peaceful, al-
though there were four election-related deaths.75 Of a 
rash of small bombings in the Tarai, the 29 March Bi-
ratnagar mosque attack was the most egregious atroc-
ity.76 Overall, the unexpectedly low level of violence 
in the Tarai suggests that armed groups’ threats were 
 
 
73 “Seven CPN-M cadres were killed and 12 were injured 
when [Armed Police Force (APF)] and [Nepal Police (NP)] 
personnel escorting an NC candidate fired at CPN-M vehi-
cles in Lamahi VDC. OHCHR found no evidence to support 
claims by the APF and NP that they opened fire in response 
to firing by CPN-M members. No firearms were reportedly 
found in the CPN-M vehicles and no-one in the NC candi-
date’s entourage was injured. OHCHR called for an inde-
pendent investigation into this incident as the information 
gathered so far indicates that the killing of the seven may 
amount to extra-judicial execution by the police”. “Constitu-
ent Assembly Elections”, OHCHR-Nepal, op. cit., p. 3. 
74 Sharma’s widow, Kamala Sharma, was selected to contest 
the seat for the UML and easily won the election on 19 April, 
with 18,804 votes to the NC’s Lal Bahadur Ghale’s 12,335. 
She was the only woman FPTP winner for the UML. “Surk-
het 1 ma Kamala Sharma Bijayi”, www.nepalipost.com/ 
nepali/nepalinews.php?&nid=5643. 
75 One man died in Dharan after being hit on the head during 
an MJF-NC clash in Sunsari; in Mahottari an NC candidate’s 
vehicle hit and killed a protestor (after shots were allegedly 
fired from the candidate’s vehicles); an independent candi-
date in Sarlahi was shot dead in circumstances that remain 
unclear; and a UML cadre was killed in Kaski, his party 
blaming the CPN(M), which has denied involvement. “Con-
stituent Assembly Elections”, OHCHR-Nepal, op. cit., p. 6. 
Nepal’s previous general elections were all marred by vio-
lence. For example, in 1991 there were ten killings on poll-
ing day, and violence forced repolling in almost one third of 
the districts. See “Election and Political Violence in Nepal”, 
DEAN, op. cit., p. 13. The May 2008 local elections in In-
dia’s West Bengal, which borders Nepal, were far more vio-
lent, with at least 37 deaths. Subir Bhaumik, “Toll in violent 
India poll rises”, BBC News, 20 May 2008. (West Bengal’s 
2003 local elections had been just as bad, with many deaths on 
the day and 30 during the campaign period. Subir Bhaumik, 
“Bengal’s bloodied poll”, BBC News, 12 May 2003.) 
76 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. 
cit., p. 6. 
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largely empty, and rumours of the palace pouring re-
sources into armed disruption were either false or vastly 
exaggerated. 
D. MUCH MOANING, FEW FORMAL  
COMPLAINTS 
The losers – and sometimes the winners – have made 
full use of the media to issue a litany of post-poll 
complaints. Some, in particular the royalist parties 
and NC leaders, had launched their public recrimina-
tions well before the polls. Many of their grievances 
appeared to be justified.77 However, the broad asper-
sions cast on the validity of the elections in press in-
terviews and speeches have not been backed up by 
many formal complaints. 
The CA electoral laws and associated regulations of-
fered a variety of means to resolve disputes or inves-
tigate alleged violations and, if necessary, punish of-
fending individuals or parties.78 The EC registered 
304 complaints before the election, mostly relating to 
code of conduct violations and obstruction in cam-
paigning. Almost all were quickly resolved, some 
having been submitted only for the record or having 
been settled before they were submitted to the EC.79 
Only 64 complaints were made about incidents on 
polling day or during the count, and all were resolved. 
Of the 106 booths where repolling was needed, the 
EC ruled for a repoll in 30, while the other cases were 
decided by DEOs. 
In the entire election period, the EC only once im-
posed a punishment – and that on one of its own offi-
cers rather than a candidate or party.80 Some further 
minor disputes took place during the vote and the 
count, but few were reported to the EC and the vast 
majority were resolved on the spot, often through ne-
gotiations between party agents, EC officials and se-
curity or administrative officials.81 The reluctance of 
 
 
77 See, for example, ibid, pp. 6-7. 
78 See ibid, p. 19. 
79 Crisis Group interview, EC spokesperson Laxman Bhatta-
rai, 9 June 2008. The breakdown of complainants is: political 
parties, 91; government entities, 55; mass media, 28; others 
(individuals), 130. 
80 See fn. 70 above. 
81 Crisis Group observed a number of minor disputes, all of 
which were eventually resolved without resort to court pro-
ceedings or formal EC sanction (although the more complex 
ones were referred to the EC for adjudication and directives). 
The incidents observed ranged from an on-the-spot argument 
over proxy voting (Chaugarhi polling station, Lalitpur dis-
trict, 10 April 2008) to counts stalled by disputes over al-
the EC and other authorities to take more determined 
action may well have deterred some potential com-
plainants from bothering to use formal channels. For 
example, OHCHR discovered that the police had taken 
no action against any alleged kidnappers, even when 
written incident reports were lodged with them.82 
There were also few formal post-election complaints. 
Some parties may have registered complaints with 
district administrative officials or district courts but, if 
so, these cases have not reached the attention of Kath-
mandu authorities or party hierarchies; the Supreme 
Court has not received any election-related writs.83 
The dedicated constituent assembly election court has 
registered sixteen cases, twelve on disputes in FPTP 
competitions and four on disputed PR counts. The 
FPTP cases relate mainly to allegations of booth cap-
ture and rigging; the PR cases involve complaints by 
candidates against their own parties, alleging that their 
selection of winning candidates was not endorsed by 
the parties’ central committees as the law stipulated. 
All these cases are pending, and court officials predict 
it may take weeks or months to conclude them. Over-
all, the picture is clear. However valid losers’ com-
plaints may be, their reluctance to use established pro-
cedures to pursue them suggests they either have little 
supporting evidence or are more interested in generat-
ing publicity than seeing justice done by the law. 
E. WHAT CAN BE CONCLUDED? 
International observers now avoid using the phrase 
“free and fair”, concentrating instead on measuring 
compliance with “international standards” while with-
holding an overall verdict. In these terms, all major 
missions submitted positive reports.84 The most nega-
tive judgement, that of the U.S. State Department, 
stopped well short of outright condemnation: “In April 
2008 the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist won a 
plurality of seats in Constituent Assembly elections 
 
 
leged cheating by rival parties (Bara and Dhanusha districts, 
13 April 2008; Sunsari district, 14 April 2008). 
82 “OHCHR was concerned to find that no action was taken by 
the police against CPN-M cadres in any of the abductions re-
ported to OHCHR, even in those cases in which First Investi-
gation Reports were subsequently filed by the victims”. “Con-
stituent Assembly Elections”, OHCHR-Nepal, op. cit., p. 4. 
83 Crisis Group interview, Shri Kanta Poudel, joint registrar, 
Supreme Court, Kathmandu, 10 June 2008. The Supreme 
Court received one complaint from Sarita Giri, relating to a 
post-poll dispute rather than an election-related case. 
84 The largest international observer missions have yet to is-
sue final reports; the Carter Center’s and EU’s are likely to 
be published during July 2008. Both of these missions, and 
ANFREL, released preliminary statements on 12 April 2008. 
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that were generally accepted by the population but 
marred by violence, intimidation and voting irregu-
larities.”85 
A reasonable conclusion is that the elections were re-
markably free and fair given the circumstances and 
despite the widespread irregularities and violence, in 
particular the killings of Maoist activists. They deliv-
ered a clear sense of the popular will and a decisive 
winning mandate for the Maoists, as evidenced by 
their very strong performance in the capital, where 
they had little chance to use coercive tactics. There is 
little mileage now in arguing they were fraudulent, 
especially as the losing parties filed very few formal 
complaints about specific incidents. More importantly, 
there is no evidence that even better elections would 
have delivered a markedly different result. 
 
 
85 “Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports – 2008”, 
U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor, 23 May 2008, at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/afdr/2008/ 
104861.htm. 
V. THE RESULTS 
A. THE BROAD PICTURE 
1. The count 
The first result arrived by the morning after the polls 
closed, thanks to a successful pilot test of electronic 
voting. The NC’s Prakash Man Singh took Kath-
mandu-1 (formerly a UML stronghold), causing party 
leaders to comment that “the morning shows the day” 
and predict they would continue to be the beneficiar-
ies of the UML and CPN(M) eating into each other’s 
base.86 However, the pattern of the early results sug-
gested that this was only happening in Kathmandu, 
where the NC did perform surprisingly strongly. 
Elsewhere, the indications of a Maoist landslide were 
impossible to deny. The counting took place more 
promptly and efficiently than any experts had predicted, 
in some cases surprising even the officials who were 
overseeing the counts.87 
The most important factor to affect public and party 
perceptions was that, as expected, almost all centres 
counted the FPTP ballots first and left the PR till 
later. This meant that the Maoists’ disproportionately 
convincing FPTP victory shaped the atmosphere be-
fore being balanced by a PR tally that reduced their 
overall share of CA seats. Within a few days of the 
election, the bulk of FPTP results were out, and more 
efficient centres had also completed the PR count.88 
All FPTP results, including repolling, were completed 
in twelve days, with the PR tally following two days 
later. After cross-checking and making the necessary 
calculations,89 the EC announced the final results, in-
cluding and allocation of PR seats by party, on 25 April. 
 
 
86 Gagan Thapa, interview on Nepal Television, 11 April 2008. 
87 Even officers in charge of counting centres where disputes 
had stalled some constituency counts reported that they were 
surprised at the smoothness of the process and impressed by 
the dedication of their staff. Crisis Group interviews, return-
ing officers, Parsa and Dhanusha districts, 13 April 2008. 
88 By the time Crisis Group reached eastern hill districts on 
13-15 April, there was little left to observe. Dhankuta district 
had completed both counts on 13 April, Tehrathum was into 
the final stage of PR counting on 14 April, and officials in 
Ilam were already busy doing a stocktake of ballot boxes and 
other materials before putting them into storage on 15 April. 
Tarai districts tended to take longer, not least because of 
their much larger populations. 
89 The PR seats to be allocated to each party were calculated ac-
cording to the modified Sainte-Lague formula. See Crisis Group 
Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit., p. 9, fn. 57. 
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The Maoists won 220 of the 575 seats, exactly twice 
as many as their nearest rival, the NC.90 (Twenty-six 
members to be nominated by the cabinet but not yet 
agreed upon will bring the CA to its total of 601.) The 
UML trailed in third place with 103 seats, while the 
MJF led the Madhesi parties with a tally of 52 seats 
making it a powerful fourth party. The Maoists routed 
their opponents in the FPTP contest, where their 120 
seats (exactly 50 per cent of the total) contrasted with 
the NC’s 37 and UML’s 33; they also emerged as the 
largest party in the Tarai, with 42 FPTP seats to the 
MJF’s 30, sweeping the western Tarai while remain-
ing shaky in the east. 
The PR results naturally tempered the distortions of 
the FPTP system. While the Maoists won 50 per cent 
of FPTP seats on a 30.5 per cent share of the vote; in 
the PR they received 29.3 per cent of the vote and a 
similar proportion of the seats on offer. The NC and 
UML, in contrast, were saved from shame by the PR 
safety net, bagging 73 and 70 seats respectively (with 
a 19.1 and 18.1 share of the vote). Five individuals 
won from two FPTP constituencies; they have now 
resigned one seat each, and five by-elections for the 
vacancies are pending.91 
2. Notable features 
The major features of the results have been thor-
oughly dissected in the Nepali media, and plentiful 
analysis is readily available.92 The nature of the Mao-
ist victory is discussed in the next section. A notable 
aspect of the FPTP race was voters’ strongly ex-
pressed distaste for many long-serving mainstream 
politicians and apparent dissatisfaction at being taken 
 
 
90 Final results can be found under http://election.gov.np/reports/ 
CAResults/. The EC’s official results do not include five 
seats won by candidates who were each victorious in two 
FPTP constituencies. They assume that only 570 members of 
the CA have been elected and have deducted the extra seats 
from the originally winning parties pending by-elections. 
91 Prachanda vacated his Rolpa-2 constituency and kept 
Kathmandu-10, Sher Bahadur Deuba vacated Kanchanpur-4 
for his home ground, Dadeldhura-1. Dev Gurung decided to 
keep Manang and resigned from Kaski-1. The MJF’s Upen-
dra Yadav and Bijaya Kumar Gachhedar both left their 
Morang constituencies for Sunsari constituencies. Although 
some parties called for prompt by-elections, the EC would 
prefer to hold them after the monsoon, given weather-related 
logistical difficulties. 
92 Useful online sources of election-related information in-
clude: Election Commission of Nepal (www.election.gov.np); 
the UN mission (UNMIN) elections page (www.unmin.org. 
np/?d=peaceprocess&p=election); and Nepal Election Portal 
(www.nepalelectionportal.org), which offers the best selec-
tion of maps and statistical charts. 
for granted by the old parties. The UML was wiped 
out in its erstwhile stronghold, the Kathmandu valley. 
Of the fifteen constituencies in Kathmandu, Bhakta-
pur and Lalitpur districts, four went to the NC, two to 
the NWPP and the remainder to the CPN(M). The 
previously unknown Jhakku Subedi, a Maoist activist 
from Rolpa, defeated the UML general secretary, Mad-
hav Kumar Nepal, in the Kathmandu constituency 
where he had been comfortably ensconced since 1991. 
The Maoist wave did not spare sympathetic individu-
als in rival parties: the CPN(M) defeated home minis-
ter and dedicated peace negotiator Krishna Prasad  
Sitaula in Jhapa, pro-alliance UML leader Bamdev 
Gautam in Bardiya and Janamorcha Nepal leader 
Lilamani Pokharel in Sindhuli. 
The NC’s humiliating defeat was particularly crush-
ing with respect to its more conservative leaders and 
members of the Koirala clan. Almost all of those who 
had spoken out in favour of a ceremonial monarchy 
were beaten, as were eighteen of the twenty Koirala 
relatives who stood in FPTP seats (G.P. Koirala’s re-
luctance to subject himself to the verdict of voters in 
his traditional constituency was a wise calculation.) 
Staunch monarchist Kamal Thapa, leader of the only 
avowedly anti-republican party, the RPP (Nepal), for-
feited his deposit in Makwanpur by failing to reach 10 
per cent. In this he was not alone: four out of five 
FPTP candidates lost their deposits.93  
The Maoists achieved many remarkably – some would 
say suspiciously – resounding victories, winning all ten 
constituencies where the margin of victory was more 
than 40 percentage points.94 In Gorkha-2, Baburam 
Bhattarai secured 81.9 per cent of the votes, defeating 
the NC by a margin of 71 per cent. This stretched even 
sympathetic observers’ credulity and angered NC lead-
ers who accepted their loss but believe the figures il-
 
 
93 “80 pc contestants failed to get 10 pc votes: EC”, nepal-
news.com, 22 April 2008. 
94 These were: Ramechhap-2 (Dilliman Tamang defeating 
the UML’s Kailash Prasad Dhungel by 46.5 per cent); Dhad-
ing-1 (Pushpa Bikram Malla by 41.2 per cent over the NC’s 
Dilman Pakhrin); Gorkha-1 (Parbati Thapa by 55.7 per cent 
over senior NC leader Chiranjivi Wagle); Gorkha-2 (Babu-
ram Bhattarai by 71 per cent); Gorkha-3 (Amar Bahadur Gu-
rung by 49.3 per cent over former NC parliamentarian Chin-
kaji Gurung); Rukum-1 (Jun Kumari Roka by 67.9 per cent); 
Rukum-2 (PLA Deputy Commander Janardan Sharma by 44 
per cent over the NC’s Prem Prakash Oli); Rolpa-1 (Jaypuri 
Gharti Magar by 56 per cent); Rolpa-2 (Maoist Chairman 
Prachanda by 59.5); Baitadi-1 (Narendra Bahadur Kunwar 
by 40 per cent). See “FPTP Winning Margin by Constitu-
ency”, at http://result.nepalelectionportal.org/report.html. 
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lustrate unsubtle cheating.95 In contrast, the highest 
NC vote was only 37.5 per cent (in the Dadeldhura PR 
contest), and its poorest showing was in Saptari with 
9.7 per cent. The UML’s best and worst PR results 
were in sparsely populated Mustang (39.7 per cent) 
and the Maoist stronghold of Gorkha (7.8 per cent). 
3. A new look assembly 
The CA is far more representative than past parlia-
ments. In the words of Ian Martin, the special repre-
sentative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), it is 
“the most inclusive body Nepal has yet known”.96 Al-
though most parties did little to meet the Election 
Act’s guidance that they should “take into account the 
principle of inclusiveness while nominating candi-
dates”97 in the FPTP race (the Maoists being the most 
notable exception), the fixed quotas for the PR race 
ensured representation of many minorities. The 575 
elected members of the CA include 50 Dalits, 204 
Madhesis and 192 janajatis.98 Only 29 women were 
elected from the 240 FPTP constituencies (23 of them 
Maoists), but the 50 per cent quota from the PR race 
brought their total representation in the CA up to one 
third. Sunil Babu Pant, a well known campaigner for 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights, became 
the first openly gay representative, when he was se-
lected from the CPN (United)’s PR list.99 
The electoral system also ensured a great diversity of 
parties. Where the purely FPTP contests of the past 
had made it nearly impossible for small parties to break 
into the system, the PR element greatly assisted the 
election of representatives from 25 parties. For exam-
ple, the CPN(ML) won not a single FPTP seat but its 
2.3 per cent of the PR vote delivered it eight seats. 
The royalist RPP was in a similar position; other roy-
alist parties also gained some PR seats, including four 
for the RPP(Nepal). The once controversial ethnic-
 
 
95 An NC leader complained that his party had at least 10,000 
supporters in the constituency but received only 6,143 votes. 
Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 14 May 2008. The 
Maoists’ PR tally in Gorkha was 65.8 per cent, which sug-
gests that Baburam Bhattarai benefited from his personal 
profile – and possibly from extra party campaigning efforts. 
The Maoists’ best PR result was in their heartland of Rolpa 
(66.4 per cent); their share of the vote in neighbouring Ru-
kum (65.6 per cent) was similar to that in Gorkha. 
96 SRSG Ian Martin, Press statement, Kathmandu, 28 May 2008. 
97 Election Act, 5(3). 
98 Crisis Group interview, Pasang Sherpa, 13 June 2008. 
99 “Constituent Assembly Elections”, OHCHR-Nepal, op. 
cit., p. 8. Thanks to the requirement that parties select 50 per 
cent women to fill PR seats, Nepal has jumped to fourteenth 
position in the global ranking of women’s representation in 
elected assemblies. 
based Rashtriya Janamukti Party secured two seats. 
The Chure Bhawar Rashtriya Ekta Samaj, a pahadi 
grouping formed to resist the Madhesi movement in 
the eastern Tarai, won one seat for its president, Ke-
shav Raj Mainali. The Nepa: Rashtriya Party, devoted 
to pushing the interests of Kathmandu’s Newar com-
munity, also secured a seat. Despite only receiving 
23,512 of the 10,739,078 valid PR votes, the Nepal 
Parivar Dal, backed by South Korea’s Unification 
Church (founded by Sun Myung Moon), managed to 
establish itself as the CA’s most unusual party.100 
The arrival of strong Madhesi parties has altered the 
look of the CA and will change the shape of politics. 
The three main Madhesi parties – MJF, TMDP and 
Sadbhavana Party – occupied fourth, fifth and sixth 
place in the national ranks, with 52, twenty and nine 
seats respectively. (The NSP(A), a member of the gov-
erning coalition, won only two seats, from the PR 
race.)101 Their strong performance was disproportion-
ately at the expense of the NC.102 However, they also 
convincingly eclipsed the Maoists in several districts. 
The CPN(M)’s poorest showings in the PR vote were 
all in Tarai districts.103 Tarai Dalits and Muslims were 
still very poorly represented. Where the Maoists did well 
in the Tarai – sweeping several western districts – they 
probably drew minority votes as well as those of pa-
hadis who might have previously supported the UML. 
The defeat of long-serving mainstream party leaders 
helped with the change of faces. Only ten of the 40 
UML central committee members who stood in the 
FPTP race survived; for the NC, only sixteen of 63 
 
 
100 Party PR results are at www.election.gov.np/reports/ 
CAResults/reportBody.php?selectedMenu1=Party%20Wise 
%20Count% 20In%20Nation. 
101 The EC’s published statistics are confusing: in its list of 
party results, they show 29 MJF FPTP winners, but in their 
cumulative totals they work on the basis of 28. In fact the 
total of declared seats was 30. However, two MJF candidates 
(Upendra Yadav and Bijay Kumar Gachhedar) won in two 
constituencies and resigned one each. In Mahottari-6, the 
MJF’s Sharat Singh Bhandari defeated the NC’s Sitaram 
Bhandari by 21 votes. Although the result was declared for 
the MJF, the NC lodged an appeal. The courts stayed the re-
sult and ruled that Sharat Singh Bhandari should not be 
sworn in as a member of the CA until the case is resolved. It 
is still pending. 
102 Prashant Jha, “Forum in Maostan”, Nepali Times, 18 
April 2008. 
103 The Maoists’ lowest PR vote was in Parsa (8.2 per cent), 
closely followed by the eastern Tarai districts of Sarlahi (9.4 
per cent) and Saptari (9.6 per cent), the heartland of the 
Madhesi movement. (In contrast, the NC performed credita-
bly in Parsa, winning 23 per cent.) Sarlahi went to the 
TMDP, whereas Saptari went to the MJF, whose own best 
share of the vote was only 25 per cent, in Siraha. 
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got through.104 Some of the giant-killers offered a very 
new image. Younger Maoist women beat well-known 
leaders such as the UML’s Bamdev Gautam (defeated 
by Sarala Regmi in Bardiya) and the NC’s Chiranjivi 
Wagle (by Parvati Thapa in Gorkha) and Chakra Prasad 
Bastola (by Dharmasila Chapagain in Jhapa). Popular 
local leader Rajendra Bahadur Amatya was defeated 
in Parsa by the MJF’s Karima Begum, a political un-
known. The most remarkable winner was perhaps  
Baban Singh, who won as an independent candidate 
from Rautahat-1 while still underground with an 
NRs.100,000 ($1,500) price-tag on his head as the 
most wanted suspect for the 1 September 2007 Kath-
mandu bombings.105 
One of the most significant gulfs between the parties 
was the age of their candidates.106 The average of 
Maoist FPTP winners was 39, whereas for the NC it 
was 53. The youngest winner was the MJF’s 25-year-
old Abhishekh Pratap Shah of Kapilvastu-5, while the 
oldest was 84-year-old Prime Minister Koirala. 
4. The PR seat distribution 
The PR contest was governed by complex and non-
transparent procedures. Nepal is one of only a handful 
of countries to have opted for a closed list system that 
left the selection of winning candidates in this portion 
of the contest entirely in the hands of party leaders.107 
The only constraints were that their choice had to be 
endorsed by their parties’ central committees and had 
to meet certain quotas for ethnic, caste and gender in-
clusiveness. Most voters, and many officials, were 
unclear about how their PR votes would translate into 
the selection of CA members.108 This system left all 
the power of patronage in a few hands and also en-
abled parties to foist otherwise unpopular candidates 




104 Khagendra Pant, “Kendriya neta chunab hare”, Naya Pat-
rika, 16 April 2008. 
105 K.P. Dhungana, “‘Most Wanted’ le jite”, Naya Patrika, 
15 April 2008. 
106 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, 
op. cit., p. 4. 
107 Ibid, p. 9. 
108 Even the most experienced and politically interested offi-
cials found it hard to explain how PR votes would translate 
into CA members. Crisis Group interviews, various districts 
including Ilam, 15 April 2008. 
109 This is not a feature of all PR systems; in fact, Nepal’s is 
the least transparent of any in use. Most PR systems either 
allow voters to indicate preferences for individual candidates 
or at least publish party lists, including the order in which 
The way in which the major old parties made their PR 
selections showed how clearly they had refused to di-
gest the lessons from their electoral debacle, despite 
having three weeks to reflect. The NC was particu-
larly hampered by its continued disunity, with the PR 
seats being internally allocated between the mother 
party and the former NC(D) breakaway in a 60:40 ra-
tio. This in itself reduced the chances for some able 
candidates, but the lack of fresh thinking was in evi-
dence in the selection. The NC’s response to its defeat 
in the Tarai was to use the PR list to bring in candi-
dates who would probably have lost in the FPTP. For 
example, it inducted no fewer than fourteen from 
Sunsari district in the eastern Tarai, not one of them a 
Madhesi. The UML made up for its Kathmandu wipe-
out by bringing in ten members from Kathmandu. Al-
though parties met the quotas, they made little effort 
to balance their selections geographically.110 
The parties’ internal selection processes unsurpris-
ingly led to ego clashes and hurt feelings. There were 
many arguments, even affecting the otherwise more 
disciplined Maoists, whose disgruntled cadres vandal-
ised their own party office in Jhapa.111 There were al-
legations that leading figures in some parties were 
demanding bribes or other favours in return for offer-
ing PR berths. Court cases regarding breaches of pro-
cedure by party leaders are still pending.112 The over-
all effect was unedifying, and underlined the severe 
reluctance with which established party leaders had 
been forced to come to terms with the demand for 
more representative candidates. 
B. WHY DID THE MAOISTS WIN? 
The Maoists’ victory may have been unexpected, but 
it is far from inexplicable. Their energy and commit-
 
 
candidates appear on them, before the election. See Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit., p. 9. 
110 The CPN(M) selected eleven candidates from Banke and 
nine from Ilam, but none from many other districts. The UML 
brought ten from Mustang alone and eight from Tehrathum. 
The NC selected fourteen from Chitwan, twelve from Ilam, 
ten from Morang, nine from Kailali and eight from Parsa. Of 
its 22 PR seats, the MJF allotted only one to a non-Madhesi 
candidate; most of the remainder went to middle and high-
caste candidates. The four seats won by Rajendra Mahato’s 
Sadbhavana Party all went to candidates from Morang. In 
one case, twenty UML district members resigned to protest 
the leadership’s failure to represent their community in the 
PR selections. “30 UML men resign en masse”, ekanti-
pur.com, 8 June 2008. 
111 “Discontent in parties over PR list”, nepalnews.com, 4 
May 2008. 
112 See Section V.D above. 
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ment have been commented on above, as has their 
flexible approach to achieving well-defined strategic 
goals. Many voters also looked to them as the party 
most likely to deliver peace and change – even if part 
of that attraction was the fear that not voting for them 
would encourage a return to war. In the absence of in-
depth research, or supplementary indicators such as 
exit polls, analysis of the reasons for the Maoist vic-
tory is necessarily speculative. Nevertheless some 
factors stand out: 
 organisation and communication. The CPN(M) 
had a well-structured campaign run by active and 
committed cadres. It had carefully planned training 
programs and public activities. It made the sheer 
size of its campaign force and mobilisation capacity 
was telling. For better or worse, the Maoists were 
in intimate contact with ordinary people through-
out the country during their underground years. 
They did not always make themselves loved, but 
they listened, learned and maintained their links. 
The established parties neglected their popular 
bases and concentrated on power politics. They 
were forced out of many rural areas by the Maoists 
but did not push hard to reestablish themselves 
when given the chance. The Maoists’ wider con-
nections enabled them both to win people over and 
use coercive tactics. 
 cultivating constituencies ignored by other par-
ties. Many classes and communities were ill-
served by the established parties. The Maoists took 
up their issues and had little competition in win-
ning their support. Even the UML neglected the 
real lower classes, marginalised communities, the 
landless and the jobless. (Although many overseas 
migrants had landed jobs thanks to party string-
pulling, those excluded were perhaps even more 
likely to turn to the Maoists.) Groups such as Tarai 
Dalits, Tharus and Rajbanshis could see hope in 
the Maoists. The CPN(M) returned 23 of the 49 
Dalits in the CA; it also put up a Rajbanshi candi-
date, who defeated Home Minister Sitaula in 
Jhapa. Plenty of hotel and restaurant workers were 
well aware that it was thanks to the Maoists that 
they benefited from a compulsory service tax.  
 clear policies and an agenda for change. The 
Maoists knew what they stood for and made sure 
voters did too. While the UML and NC’s conver-
sions seemed belated and unconvincing, the trans-
formational agendas of the republic, CA and fed-
eralism belonged to the Maoists. They had set the 
agenda and knew their core messages. The old par-
ties sounded tired and bereft of ideas in comparison. 
 calculated strong-arm tactics. The Maoists did 
flex their muscles in various ways and also used 
more subtle threats.113 
 not taking anything for granted. The NC and 
UML were overconfident, relying on a presumed 
“core vote” that turned out to be much smaller 
than they anticipated. The Maoists worked harder 
for every vote and correctly judged the political 
situation, including party loyalties, to be more fluid 
than other parties realised (with the exception of 
the Madhesi parties, who thrived for the same rea-
son). First-time voters numbered in the millions – 
around 22 per cent of the electorate. With less 
rigid political affiliations and different genera-
tional perspectives, many saw little to attract them 
in the old parties. In contrast, the Maoists made 
determined efforts to win youth support, male and 
female, and to select many young candidates. 
Last but perhaps most important was the role of 
struggle and sacrifice. Many non-Maoists, even in-
cluding confirmed opponents, are willing to recognise 
that the Maoists fought hard to bring about political 
change – several voters said this alone had persuaded 
them to vote for the CPN(M).114 However much the 
other parties had joined the Maoists’ CA and republi-
can agenda, most people saw clearly that the CPN(M) 
deserved the credit for leading this political revolu-
tion. This was nothing new. The NC had won similar 
public approval in the 1950s (when it led the fight 
against the Ranas), and both the NC and UML had 
earned approval for their role in spearheading the 1990 
people’s movement. For politicians in these parties, 
their personal itihas (“history”) is still a key qualifica-
tion for rank and office – time spent in jail under the 
Panchayat or on the street in protests counts. Viewed 
in this light, public recognition for the Maoists’ long 
years of struggle was not so surprising. 
 
 
113 The Maoists used subtlety as well as brute force. For ex-
ample, a senior candidate who goes door-to-door campaign-
ing and is received by a grandmother might say: “I’m not 
asking for your vote but for your blessing when we go back 
to the jungle. India, America, the king, the NC and UML 
have all sidelined us and are plotting to make us lose – even 
though we have the people’s support. So please be ready to 
help us like before when we come to seek shelter after the 
war starts again”. The voter would realise which way to vote 
for peace – and to avoid having to shelter guerrillas as the army 
came looking for them. Another party worker might show 
villagers footage of the PLA’s battles, asking “if we were 
able to shoot videos while we were fighting and killing, will 
it be hard for us to see who you vote for?” Many more carried 
binoculars and invited voters to try them out, before explain-
ing that it would be easy to check which way they voted. Cri-
sis Group interviews, rural voters, various districts, April 2008. 
114 Crisis Group interviews, various districts, March-April 2008. 
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C. WHY DID WE (ALMOST) ALL  
GET IT WRONG? 
A major feature of the elections was the shock result. 
However, those most surprised at the outcome were 
probably those who had done most, however uninten-
tionally, to reinforce a misleading assessment of the 
Maoists’ prospects. 
The scale of this miscalculation, and its continued 
relevance to the political view from Kathmandu and 
abroad, demand examination. The Maoist press, of 
course, can claim that they predicted victory cor-
rectly. However, their stridently partisan reporting en-
couraged unbiased readers to take their predictions 
with a large grain of salt. The rest of the media, and 
domestic and international analysts, largely expected 
the Maoists to trail in third place. Crisis Group’s own 
pre-election report, while avoiding predictions, 
strongly implied that this was the likely outcome and 
focused disproportionately on the CPN(M) and the 
palace as the most likely post-election spoilers.115 
The major factors behind these miscalculations are 
not just of historical interest. They reflect well-
established shortcomings in the analysis that is avail-
able to anyone who does not spend time outside the 
capital. Given that the brief spark of self-critical in-
trospection within the media and mainstream parties 
appears to have had little lasting effect, it is important 
to recall the weaknesses that the election revealed: 
 capital-centrism and circular analysis. Major 
media outlets, analysts and diplomats retained 
their resolute Kathmandu focus. Outside the valley 
the fact the Maoists were not facing humiliation 
became clearer and clearer as the day grew closer. 
For many ordinary voters, it was obvious well be-
fore polling day.116 Local journalists insist that 
their stories reflected this fact, but their reporting 
was discounted by Kathmandu-based editors, who 
preferred to stick with their own view of national 
reality.117 Analysts in the capital fed off each other 
 
 
115 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, 
op. cit. 
116 Most voters in hill districts and the western Tarai ex-
pected the CPN(M) would be at least a very strong con-
tender. Even among committed NC and UML supporters, 
very few echoed the confidence of party leaders about their 
prospects. Crisis Group interviews, passim. 
117 Crisis Group interviews, local correspondents for national 
press, radio and TV outlets, various districts across all five 
development regions, January-June 2008. 
and reinforced mutual misconceptions while ignor-
ing primary sources.118 
 weak mainstream media. All the weaknesses of 
the mainstream media came into play. There was a 
combination of overt bias and blindness to facts. 
Journalists and commentators were unwilling to 
abandon long-held positions, especially the belief 
that the Maoists could not possibly have genuine 
widespread support. This was reinforced by the 
liberal article of faith that “Nepalis won’t tolerate 
authoritarianism of right or left” and the long-
standing insistence on triangulating politics by 
putting the Maoists at the opposite end of the po-
litical spectrum to the king but seeing them as fun-
damentally alike in other “totalitarian” respects. 
Almost all mainstream journalists are at least 
UML or NC-leaning and often directly linked 
(many correspondents secure their positions 
through student party political connections). The 
more entertaining, if scurrilous, weekly papers are 
unabashedly partisan – they do investigative re-
porting but normally only when the results suit 
their political stance, which undermines their 
credibility even when they are accurate. By far the 
best single piece of pre-election reporting came 
from an Indian journalist familiar with Nepal but 
only an occasional visitor.119 
 almost no one understands the Maoists or feels 
they need to. Non-Maoist journalists, academics 
and analysts who have made serious efforts to un-
derstand Maoist thinking are pitifully few and far 
between. Ten years of armed conflict and donor 
generosity produced a slew of “conflict experts” 
but not one academic specialist on Maoism and the 
 
 
118 Crisis Group also came in for criticism on this front: “[Kath-
mandu Post] Correspondent Bikash Sangraula says that the 
overwhelming victory by Maoist parties in Nepal’s parlia-
mentary elections fooled everyone, ‘the experts, the Maoists, 
and the journalists, including me….In the run-up to the elec-
tion, the media was relying on what the ‘political experts’ said. 
The media was quoting research groups, like the International 
Crisis Group, that said Nepal could face post-election prob-
lems owing to unwillingness by the Maoists to accept election 
results.…There was basically a vicious cycle of wrong infor-
mation and analysis’”. David Clark Scott, “Reporters on the 
Job”, The Christian Science Monitor, 15 April 2008. 
119 Siddharth Varadarajan, “A vote for change, a vote for 
peace”, The Hindu, 1 April 2008. This article still deserves 
reading as a testament to how much of the shape of things to 
come could have been predicted by reporters relying on the 
basic tools of their trade – going out and listening to people 
with an open mind. Varadarajan spent eight days covering 
fifteen constituencies. The combined reporting of Nepal’s 
many journalists could surely have thrown up at least as 
much insight as this solo effort. 
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CPN(M) nor, despite vast investments in training, 
a single expert journalist beyond the handful who 
were already interested and well informed in their 
own right. 
 no helpful polling. Psephology is not an infallible 
discipline even under the best of conditions. In 
Nepal, the history of wide-scale opinion surveys is 
very short,120 and the circumstances of the CA 
election made it particularly hard for even the best 
polls to predict voter behaviour.121 Nepal is far 
from alone: Indian pollsters suffered a major em-
barrassment in the 2004 general elections, when 
they almost universally – and wrongly – forecast a 
victory for the incumbent BJP-led National De-
mocratic Alliance. Some of India’s most dedicated 
professional psephologists were also criticised for 
inaccuracies in their 2008 state election exit polls.122  
The unhelpfulness of Nepal’s opinion surveys was 
neither surprising nor due to amateurishness on the 
part of practitioners. The discipline simply needs 
more time to develop and learn from local condi-
tions. The nine-year gap since the last election, 
which meant that over one-fifth of the CA elector-
ate were first-time voters, should not be repeated if 
parties stick to the interim constitution’s timetable 
 
 
120 On political opinion polling in Nepal, see Sudhindra 
Sharma and Pawan Kumar Sen, Political Opinion Poll in 
Nepal’s Context, Studies in Nepali History and Society, vol. 
10, no. 2 (2005), pp. 321-358. The major surveys prior to the 
election were carried out by Interdisciplinary Analysts (see 
fn. 46 above). 
121 As one of the experts who has pioneered systematic poll-
ing commented, the very high number of “don’t know/can’t 
say” responses to voting intention questions in recent sur-
veys was in itself an indication of the difficulty in making 
firm forecasts. Sudhindra Sharma, speaking on “Naya Ne-
pal”, BBC World Service, 12 April 2008. As Crisis Group 
had cautioned, “The complexity of the parallel system, the 
vagaries of voter behaviour, the weak tradition of opinion 
polling and the fluidity of the post-conflict political land-
scape all contribute to a situation that defies confident pre-
diction. There has been little research on voter behaviour, 
and it is in any event uncertain whether old loyalties will 
outweigh more immediate concerns. The arrival of the Mao-
ists as an untested electoral force may lead to shifts in sup-
port among leftist voters and beyond”. Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit., p. 17. 
122 For example, an exit poll in the May 2008 Karnataka state 
elections organised by the respected Centre for the Study of 
Developing Studies wrongly predicted a hung assembly with 
Congress as the largest party. “Exit polls give different pic-
tures”, The Hindu, 23 May 2008. Such polls had also been 
criticised in 2006, despite their relative accuracy. See K. Na-
rayanan, “How CSDS fine-tunes polling exercise”, The 
Hindu, 22 May 2006. 
for completing the constitution-writing process 
within two years. 
 mainstream parties’ own miscalculations. De-
spite having such large networks on the ground, 
NC and UML leaders did not have a good under-
standing of political realities. Nevertheless, ob-
servers felt there must have been some solid rea-
sons for their confidence.123 In contrast, Maoist 
leaders were less confident in private than in pub-
lic, at least until the campaign gathered momen-
tum.124 Party spokesperson Krishna Bahadur Ma-
hara explained, “all parties claim they’ll win a 
majority, so we do too – that’s natural – but we’ll 
respect the results”.125 
 changing popular mood. Voters’ intentions were 
sometimes hard to gauge until the campaign picked 
up. There probably were large numbers of floating 
voters who either took time to make up their minds 
or only started talking more firmly about their in-
tentions late in the day. Many people were unsure 
the elections were going to happen at all, and many 
Maoist voters may have been reluctant to express 
their support for the CPN(M) while it was still 
viewed as an “outside” and partly illegitimate force.  
It may be that the story was just too simple for ana-
lysts primed to read between the lines and look for 
conspiracies and hidden meanings. In the end, the 
main players did more or less what they said they 
would – from their policy platforms to holding the 
 
 
123 A number of factors appear to have affected communica-
tion between grass-roots party activists (who were aware that 
they faced an uphill struggle) and party leaders. Some activ-
ists may have chosen not to report on the true situation, ei-
ther out of disillusionment with their superiors or out of fear 
of being blamed for the negative message; others had their 
concerns dismissed as pessimism. 
124 It would, however, be wrong to say that Maoist organisers 
displayed any significant lack of confidence after the end of 
2007. By January 2008, district party officials were upbeat in 
their presentation and busy with practicalities, such as train-
ing activists in election campaigning techniques. Crisis 
Group interviews, Banke, Morang, Kailali districts, January 
2008. Four weeks before the election, Baburam Bhattarai 
expressed no doubts: “The most likely scenario is that we’ll 
be the largest political force after the elections. International 
powers will have to accept this and the popular desire for 
change”. Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 14 March 2008. 
125 Crisis Group interview, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Kath-
mandu, 9 March 2008. By the last week of the campaign, 
Mahara and other party leaders, who had spent time in many 
districts, were much more upbeat, sensing a swing of support 
towards them. Crisis Group interviews, Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara, Pyuthan, 5 April 2008; Baburam Bhattarai, tele-
phone interview, 8 April 2008, Shaligram Jammarkattel, ; 
telephone interview, 9 April 2008. 
Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful Revolution? 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°155, 3 July 2008 Page 20 
 
 
election and implementing the republic. The Maoists, 
and other parties, stuck to their vow to make sure the 
elections went ahead. As his acolytes had always 
promised, the king did not interfere overtly. The only 
people whose public promises were seriously out of 
step with their behaviour were the armed Madhesi 
groups, whose campaign of violence fell far short of 
their dire threats. 
Despite the success of polling day, it was, however, 
right to warn about procedural difficulties in the af-
termath, as well as the fact that the behaviour of pow-
erful losers would shape the next steps (although 
these turned out to be the NC and UML rather than 
the Maoists). Fears that there could have been more 
violence and disorder were not fulfilled, but the po-
tential was definitely there. The results did underline 
that no outcome (including the actual one) would be 
inherently stabilising or conflict-reducing.126 
 
 
126 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, 
op. cit., p. 17. “No configuration of results is without conflict 
risk. Any of the possible outcomes could aggravate tensions, 
and each would generate powerful losers”. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nepal’s elections were a major step forward in the 
peace process, and for this all political parties and in-
stitutions – from the Election Commission and secu-
rity personnel to civil society groups who kept up 
pressure for a free and fair vote – deserve much 
credit. The fact that they were also a triumph of de-
mocracy owes more to the Maoists and new parties 
such as the MJF than the old “democratic” main-
stream. For all the Maoists’ use of intimidation and 
the MJF’s policy flip-flopping, it was their campaigns 
that allowed voters to wield power, not only deliver-
ing a more representative assembly but voting out 
many unloved old faces that most citizens had 
thought they would be burdened with in perpetuity. 
However, the results have left a confused political 
landscape with the potential for many future disputes, 
even the resumption of conflict. The Maoist victory 
was surprisingly clean in terms of their behaviour but 
much less clean in pure numbers: commanding just 
over one third of the new CA, they have the power to 
block anything but can achieve nothing without sup-
port from other parties. Their opponents have shown 
little willingness to recognise their defeat or to smooth 
the way towards completion of the peace process and 
the writing of a new constitution. The way in which 
political leaders cope with the political challenges of 
the election aftermath, set out in the companion Crisis 
Group report, will determine whether the revolution-
ary result delivers peace and change or further conflict.  
Kathmandu/Brussels, 3 July 2008 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS  
 
 
ANFREL Asian Network for Free Election 
APF Armed Police Force 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
CA Constituent Assembly 
CPN(M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
CPN(ML) Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) 
DEO District Election Officer 
EC Election Commission 
EU European Union 
FPTP First Past the Post 
MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (sometimes referred to in other sources as the  
Madhesi People’s Rights Forum, MPRF) 
NEOC National Election Observation Committee 
NC Nepali Congress 
NC(D) Nepali Congress (Democratic) 
NP Nepal Police 
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Maoist) 
PR Proportional Representation 
RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 
RPP(N) Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal) 
TMDP Tarai Madhes Democratic Party 
UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal 
YCL Young Communist League 
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTION RESULTS127 
 
 


















Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)  30.5 120 23 29.3 100 220 38.3 
Nepali Congress  22.8 37 2 21.1 73 110 19.1 
Communist Party of Nepal (UML)  21.6 33 1 20.3 70 103 17.9 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum  6.2 30 2 6.3 22 52 8.7 
Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party  3.4 9 1 3.2 11 20 3.5 
Sadbhavana Party  1.7 4 0 1.6 5 9 1.6 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party  3.0   2.5 8 8 1.4 
Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist)  1.6   2.3 8 8 1.4 
Janamorcha Nepal 1.3 2 0 1.5 5 7 1.2 
Communist Party of Nepal (United) 0.4   1.4 5 5 0.9 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party Nepal 0.7   1.0 4 4 0.7 
Rashtriya Janamorcha  0.9 1 0 1.0 3 4 0.7 
Nepal Workers and Peasants Party  0.6 2 0 0.7 2 4 0.7 
Rashtriya Janashakti Party  0.8   1.0 3 3 0.5 
Federal Democratic National Forum  0.3   0.7 2 2 0.4 
Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi)  0.4   0.5 2 2 0.4 
Rashtriya Janamukti Party  0.4   0.5 2 2 0.4 
Nepali Janata Dal  0.2   0.5 2 2 0.4 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified)  0.5   0.5 2 2 0.4 
Independent  1.2 2 0   2 0.4 
Dalit Janajati Party  0.3   0.4 1 1 0.2 
Nepa: Rashtriya Party  0.1   0.4 1 1 0.2 
Samajwadi Prajatantrik. Janata Party, Nepal  0.1   0.3 1 1 0.2 
Chure Bhawar Rashtriya Ekata Party Nepal  0.2   0.3 1 1 0.2 
Nepal Lokatantrik Samajbadi Dal  0.1   0.2 1 1 0.2 
Nepal Parivar Dal     0.2 1 1 0.2 
Other 0.6   2.5 0  0 
Invalid ballots  5.2   3.7    
*These figures are percentages of 575 CA seats filled by election; 26 members remain to be nominated by the cabinet. 
 
 
127 Adapted from the results declared by the Election Commission of Nepal on 25 April 2008. These figures include ten FPTP 
seats won by five individuals contesting from two constituencies each. Five seats have now been resigned and will be contested in 
by-elections. This affects the CPN(M) (two seats), MJF (two seats) and NC (one seat). The MJF’s 30 FPTP seats also include 
Mahottari-6, which was declared for them but is now subject to a court appeal (See fn. 101 above). 
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